Hungary further argued that it was entitled to invoke a number
of events which, cumulatively, would have constituted a fundamental
change of circumstances. In this respect it specified profound changes of
a political nature, the Project's diminishing economic viability, the
progress of environmental knowledge and the development of new norms
and prescriptions of international environmental law (see paragraph 95
above).
The Court recalls that, in the Fislzrries Jurisdiction case, it stated that
"Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, . . .
may in many respects be considered as a codification of existing customary
law on the subject of the termination of a treaty relationship
on account of change of circumstances" (I. C. J. Reports 1973, p. 63,
para. 36).
The prevailing political situation was certainly relevant for the conclusion
of the 1977 Treaty. But the Court will recall that the Treaty provided
for a joint investment programme for the production of energy, the control
of floods and the improvement of navigation on the Danube. In the
Court's view, the prevalent political conditions were thus not so closely
linked to the object and purpose of the Treaty that they constituted an
essential basis of the consent of the parties and, in changing, radically
altered the extent of the obligations still to be performed. The same holds
good for the economic system in force at the time of the conclusion of the
1977 Treaty. Besides, even though the estimated profitability of the
Project might have appeared less in 1992 than in 1977, it does not appear
from the record before the Court that it was bound to diminish to such
an extent that the treaty obligations of the parties would have been radically
transformed as a result.
The Court does not consider that new developments in the state of environmental knowledge and of environmental law can be said to
have been completely unforeseen. What is more, the formulation of
Articles 15, 19 and 20, designed to accommodate change, made it possible
for the parties to take account of such developments and to apply
them when implementing those treaty provisions.
The changed circumstances advanced by Hungary are, in the Court's
view, not of such a nature, either individually or collectively, that their
effect would radically transform the extent of the obligations still to be
performed in order to accomplish the Project. A fundamental change of
circumstances must have been unforeseen; the existence of the circumstances
at the time of the Treaty's conclusion must have constituted an
essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the Treaty.
The negative and conditional wording of Article 62 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties is a clear indication moreover that the
stability of treaty relations requires that the plea of fundamental change
of circumstances be applied only in exceptional cases.
of events which, cumulatively, would have constituted a fundamental
change of circumstances. In this respect it specified profound changes of
a political nature, the Project's diminishing economic viability, the
progress of environmental knowledge and the development of new norms
and prescriptions of international environmental law (see paragraph 95
above).
The Court recalls that, in the Fislzrries Jurisdiction case, it stated that
"Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, . . .
may in many respects be considered as a codification of existing customary
law on the subject of the termination of a treaty relationship
on account of change of circumstances" (I. C. J. Reports 1973, p. 63,
para. 36).
The prevailing political situation was certainly relevant for the conclusion
of the 1977 Treaty. But the Court will recall that the Treaty provided
for a joint investment programme for the production of energy, the control
of floods and the improvement of navigation on the Danube. In the
Court's view, the prevalent political conditions were thus not so closely
linked to the object and purpose of the Treaty that they constituted an
essential basis of the consent of the parties and, in changing, radically
altered the extent of the obligations still to be performed. The same holds
good for the economic system in force at the time of the conclusion of the
1977 Treaty. Besides, even though the estimated profitability of the
Project might have appeared less in 1992 than in 1977, it does not appear
from the record before the Court that it was bound to diminish to such
an extent that the treaty obligations of the parties would have been radically
transformed as a result.
The Court does not consider that new developments in the state of environmental knowledge and of environmental law can be said to
have been completely unforeseen. What is more, the formulation of
Articles 15, 19 and 20, designed to accommodate change, made it possible
for the parties to take account of such developments and to apply
them when implementing those treaty provisions.
The changed circumstances advanced by Hungary are, in the Court's
view, not of such a nature, either individually or collectively, that their
effect would radically transform the extent of the obligations still to be
performed in order to accomplish the Project. A fundamental change of
circumstances must have been unforeseen; the existence of the circumstances
at the time of the Treaty's conclusion must have constituted an
essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the Treaty.
The negative and conditional wording of Article 62 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties is a clear indication moreover that the
stability of treaty relations requires that the plea of fundamental change
of circumstances be applied only in exceptional cases.
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